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HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LITIGATION IN
MARYLAND: THEORIES OF RECOVERY
AND PROOF OF CAUSATION
Ian Gallacher*
The bar is reminded that sound statistical analysis is a task both
complex and arduous. Indeed, obtaining sound results by these
means, results that can withstand informed testing and sifting
both as to method and result, is a mission of comparable diffi-
culty to arriving at a correct diagnosis of disease. We are no
more statisticians than we are physicians, and counsel who ex-
pect of us informed and consistent treatment of such proofs are
well advised to proceed as do those who advance knotty medical
problems for resolution. Our innate capacity in such matters ex-
tends to "the inexorable zero" and perhaps, unevenly, some-
what beyond; but the day is long past.., when we proceed with
any confidence toward broad conclusions from crude and in-
complete statistics. That everyone who has eaten bread has died
may tell us something about bread, but not very much.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent torrent of lawsuits concerning exposure to hazardous sub-
stances2 shows no signs of diminishing. The ingenuity of the plaintiff's
* Ian Gallacher is an associate at the law firm of Goodell, DeVries, Leech & Gray,
LLP, where he practices in the areas of medical device, toxic tort, and complex litigation.
An earlier version of this article was presented as part of a program on toxic tort litigation
given by the Judicial Institute of Maryland in October, 1995. The author would like to
thank Barbara Hammonds and the staff of the Judicial Institute for their assistance and
permission to re-use some of that material. The author would also like to thank the follow-
ing individuals for their insights and helpful suggestions: Charles P. Goodell, Jr., Hilary D.
Caplan, Teri L. Kaufman, Kelly Hughes Iverson, Martin Freeman, John E. Griffith, Jr., and
Colleen Rathbun. Thanks also to Julia McKinstry for her unflagging support.
1. Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 410 (5th Cir. 1981) (footnote
omitted).
2. "Hazardous substances" can be defined as
[O]ccupational or environmental toxins or consumer products that are character-
ized by five properties. First, people are exposed to them in a chronic and rela-
tively low-dose fashion. Second, exposed persons lack awareness of the toxic
effect during the initial phase of the exposure. Third, the exposure is followed by
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bar in developing new theories of recovery and methods of proof is
matched only by the defense bar's ability to cast doubt on entire areas of
proposed expert testimony offered to prove causation. As a result, courts
are introduced to new and challenging concepts such as the "one hit"
theory, 3 "toxic soup,"4 "fiber drift" theory,5 and multiple chemical sensi-
tivity syndrome.
6
This Article is intended to provide a framework for the analysis of the
most commonly raised theories of recovery and modes of proof of causa-
tion offered in hazardous substance exposure cases, with particular refer-
ence to the law of Maryland. It first introduces theories of recovery that
frequently have been offered by plaintiffs-present injury, multiple chem-
ical sensitivity syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, increased risk of
injury, fear of future injury, and medical monitoring-as well as some of
the inherent problems of such theories. This Article then. addresses the
issue of standards of proof of causation and the central role' of the expert
witness in such proof. Lastly, analyzed in detail, is the nature of expert
a latency period before the disease or injury manifests itself. Fourth, the injury or
disease at least produces chronic defects and is usually irreversible. Fifth, the
hazardous substance is not left in the body in a way that firmly links the disease or
injury with the substance. The paradigm of hazardous substances is the occupa-
tional or environmental carcinogen. Substances such as teratogens, certain agents.
that cause chronic lung disease, and heavy metals that produce neurological dis-
ease exemplify these five characteristics of hazardous substances.
Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty
in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 501-02 (1988) (footnotes
omitted). Although not a perfect definition (it applies almost as well to cream cheese as it
does to asbestos), Brennan's formulation serves as a working definition for the purposes of
this paper.
3. The principle behind the "one-hit" theory is that there is no quantity of a carcino-
gen that a person can be exposed to without incurring some increased risk. Marry v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847,851 (M.D. Pa. 1988). In other words, one fiber of a
carcinogenic substance coming into contact with the body causes an increased risk of
cancer.
4. Courts face the "toxic soup" issue when a plaintiff is able to show that a variety of
toxic substances were present at a site, but have been unable to show a causal connection
between any one product and the specific injury they allegedly have suffered. See, e.g.,
McClelland v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 735 F. Supp. 172, 174 (D. Md. 1990). In
Maryland, which has not adopted the "market share" theory of product liability, claims
based on "toxic soup" are unlikely to survive summary judgement. Id.
5. "Fiber drift" theory posits that fibers of a carcinogen, such as asbestos, can become
airborne and therefore drift to different locales within a site. Eagle-Pitcher v. Balbos, 326
Md. 179, 216-17 (1992). The "fiber drift" theory radically expands the potential liability of
a defendant, because, if accepted, it can explain injuries suffered by workers who were not
in direct contact with the carcinogen, but who worked in areas where the carcinogenic
fibers could have drifted.
6. See discussion, infra, and notes 10-25 and accompanying text.
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testimony typically offered, including areas of expertise and their rela-
tionship to the so-called Frye/Reed test7 and the advantages and disad-
vantages of the types of studies relied on by experts in these areas.
II. THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Plaintiffs have offered many theories of recovery for exposure to haz-
ardous substances. The following are the most common theories and are
discussed here, starting with those which have the most apparent manifes-
tations of symptoms, and concluding with asymptomatic plaintiffs seeking
present recovery for future events.
A. Present Injury
The least complicated theory of recovery is presented by a plaintiff cur-
rently suffering from symptoms that are directly attributed to exposure to
a hazardous substance. The symptoms suffered by such a plaintiff are
typically serious or life-threatening. Such plaintiffs include workers ex-
posed to asbestos during their professional lives who now suffer from a
range of ailments, from microscopic changes in their internal physiology
to mesothelioma, as well as workers exposed to toxic chemicals and other
hazardous substances.8
A plaintiff usually can prove with a simple diagnosis that he or she
suffers from the alleged medical condition. The more difficult issue in a
recovery for a present injury is attributing the medical condition to the
exposure to a hazardous substance.9
7. The Frye/Reed test is familiar to practitioners as the test for the admissibility of
expert testimony before Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579
(1993). The test was first established in Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923), and it requires that, in order for expert testimony regarding scientific testing to be
admissible, it must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs. Id. at 1014. The Frye standard was specifically adopted
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, in a four-to-three decision, in Reed v. State, 391 A.2d
364, 368 (Md. Ct. App. 1978). Although Reed was a criminal case, the test also has been
applied in civil cases as well. See, e.g., Haines v. Shanholtz, 468 A.2d 1365 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1984). Maryland has not adopted the Supreme Court's new formulation on the ad-
missibility of expert testimony set forth in Daubert. For a full discussion of Maryland evi-
dentiary issues, see JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR., MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK (1989).
8. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991)
(worker exposed to nickel and cadmium fumes for 14 years died "as a result of rare, small-
cell form of cancer that originated in his colon and metastasized to his liver"); Ferebee v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1532-33 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (worker alleging long-term
exposure to paraquat died from pulmonary fibrosis).
9. See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1534-35.
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B. Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome
Multiple Chemical Sensitivity Syndrome ("MCSS") 1° is perhaps the
most controversial of all of the theories of recovery proposed by plain-
tiffs. MCSS is not easily defined. The Ad Hoc Committee on Environ-
mental Hypersensitivity Disorders of the Ontario Ministry of Health
proposed the following definition of MCSS:
[A] chronic (i.e. continuing for more than three months) mul-
tisystem disorder, usually involving symptoms of the central ner-
vous system. Affected persons are frequently intolerant to some
foods and they react adversely to some chemicals and to envi-
ronmental agents, singly or in combination, at levels generally
tolerated by the majority. Affected persons have varying de-
grees of morbidity, from mild discomfort to total disability.
Upon physical examination, the patient is normally free from
any abnormal, objective findings. Although abnormalities of
complement and lymphocytes have been reported, no single lab-
oratory test, including serum IgE, is consistently altered. Im-
provement is associated with avoidance of suspected agents and
symptoms recur with re-exposure. 11
A scientist working in the MCSS field defined MCSS as:
[A]n acquired disorder characterized by recurrent symptoms,
referable to multiple organ systems, occurring in response to de-
monstrable exposure to many chemically unrelated compounds
at doses far below those established in the general population to
cause harmful effects. No single widely accepted test of physio-
logic function can be shown to correlate with symptoms. 2
The symptoms of MCSS are as numerous as the definitions, including:
"depression, irritability, mood swings, inability to concentrate or think
clearly, poor memory, fatigue, drowsiness, diarrhea, constipation, sneez-
ing, runny or stuffy nose, wheezing, itching eyes and nose, skin rashes,
headache, muscle and joint pain, frequent urination, pounding heart,
muscle incoordination, swelling of various parts of the body and even
10. MCSS is also known as ecological illness, environmental illness, chemical hyper-
sensitivity syndrome, cerebral allergy, total allergy syndrome, or 20th-century disease.
11. Committee on Environmental Hypersensitivities, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Environmental Hypersensitivity Disorders, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF HEALTH (1985),
quoted in Abba I. Terr, M.D., Clinical Ecology, Position Paper of the American College of
Physicians, 111 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 168, 168 (1989).
12. Terr, supra note 11, at 168 (quoting Mark R. Cullen, M.D., The Worker with Multi-
ple Chemical Hypersensitivities: An Overview, 2 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 655, 657 (1987)).
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schizophrenia."' 3 Because MCSS is polysymptomatic with a multi-facto-
rial etiology, it mimics numerous other medical conditions, and there is
no test that clearly will identify it.' 4
Patients with MCSS frequently are treated with chemical-exposure
avoidance, diet manipulation, vitamins, and neutralization therapy. Prac-
titioners "commonly recommend avoidance of perfumes, plastics, chlo-
rine, alcohol, detergents, pesticides, smoke, natural gas fuel, carpets,
gasoline, vehicle exhaust, restaurants, and synthetics."' 5 Practicing avoid-
ance of these chemicals can involve relocation from an urban setting or
withdrawal from many typically urban activities.' 6
The dietary component of the treatment typically involves the "eating
13. Barrett, Unproven "Allergies": An Epidemic of Nonsense, Special Report of the
American Council on Science and Health (1993).
14. There are, however, several tests that frequently are performed by those practi-
tioners who accept MCSS as a recognized condition. In particular, a "provocation-neutral-
ization" test is frequently administered. In this test, a patient is administered doses of
certain substances, usually including formaldehyde, phenol, alcohol, glycerin, saline, water,
histamine, tobacco, newsprint, foods, food additives, and inhalant allergens. This list pre-
sumably would be supplemented were the practitioner to suspect that the MCSS was
caused by workplace exposure to hazardous substances. These doses are administered
either by intracutaneous injection or by sublingual drops. A test is determined to be posi-
tive if the patient shows subjective symptoms within ten minutes. If the patient does not
show symptoms, higher doses are administered until a positive result is achieved. Terr,
supra note 11, at 170.
15. Terr, supra note 11, at 170.
16. An example of the lifestyle of one diagnosed with MCSS can be found in Lawson
v. Sullivan, No. 88C-10128, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18758 (N.D. IU. Oct. 30, 1990). The
plaintiff, a senior editor for publications at Northwestern University, claimed social secur-
ity benefits for her MCSS. Id. at *1.
Since her treatment with Dr. Randolph, plaintiff has drastically changed her life-
style and home environment. She now follows a Rotary Diet, she dines out much
less, visits friends less, traveling is considerably curtailed, she bakes the newspa-
per every morning [Footnote 22 states plaintiff is highly sensitive to Toluene, a
chemical found in printer's ink. Dr. Randolph believes that plaintiff's chemical
sensitivity to Toluene was "probably picked up from printer's ink exposure over
the years as a galley proof reader." Baking the newspaper apparently reduces the
toxic effects of Toluene], no longer drives to gas stations to get gas in the car, and
avoids supermarkets, fabric stores, movie theaters, copy centers and xerox ma-
chines. Air purifiers are found in her automobile and living room. She lives "in
constant fear of getting zapped by someone's deodorant or fabric softener."
When she "smelled formaldehyde in [her] polyester/cotton pillow cases, [she]
switched to all-cotton." She spends much of her time in her oasis - "a room
made as pollutant-free as possible, with a portable electric heater." Her husband
is most sympathetic to her condition, and has changed his shampoo, toothpaste,
bath soap, detergents, removed the carpeting from her 'oasis,' and changed the
gas kitchen stove to an electric one.
Id. at *5-6 (footnotes omitted).
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of only 'natural' foods purchased in specialty stores.., in order to avoid
pesticides and food additives."". In particular, sugar is often avoided by
patients with "candida hypersensitivity syndrome" because it is believed
to enhance colonization of the intestinal tract by the fungus C. albicans1 8
Vitamins often are prescribed in "megadoses," and mineral supplements,
amino acids, and antioxidants also are frequently recommended. Drug
therapy is avoided.19
Other protocols also are used to treat MCSS. One such protocol, neu-
tralization therapy, is an extension of the testing process in which the
patient self-administers extracts of test substances in an attempt to relieve
present symptoms or prevent anticipated symptoms."0
Nevertheless, MCSS is a controversial theory that has received little
support in mainstream medical circles. The Council on Scientific Affairs
of the American Medical Association has found that there are "no well-
controlled studies establishing a clear mechanism or cause for MCSS; and
• . . there are no well-controlled studies providing confirmation of the
efficacy of the diagnostic and therapeutic modalities relied on by those
who practice clinical ecology., 21 "Until ... accurate, reproducible, and
well-controlled studies are available, the Council ... [has recommended]
that... [MCSS] should not be recognized as a clinical syndrome. ''22
The portmanteau-like quality of MCSS makes it an appealing theory of
recovery to plaintiffs. As a condition, MCSS explains a number of objec-
tively quantifiable symptoms that can be tied to a specific exposure. Ad-
ditionally, because the patient is currently experiencing remission from
symptoms of the syndrome, he is not attempting to recover for a possible
future condition. Consequently, he is not faced with the proof problems
inherent in litigating a possible future condition.
Although MCSS has not yet reached the reported decisions of the
Maryland courts, its time for litigation has come. The Baltimore Sun, on
October 11, 1994, reported the story of Mary Helinski, an employee of
Bell Atlantic Corporation, who was suing her employer and four manu-
facturers of carbonless copy paper for causing her to suffer from MCSS. 3




21. Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Council Report:
Clinical Ecology, 268 JAMA 3465, 3467 (1992).
22. Id.
23. Michael Dresser, Woman's Case Spotlights Dispute Over New Chemical Disorder,
BALT. SUN, Oct. 11, 1994, at 9C.
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In addition, The Baltimore Sun, on July 25, 1994, reported the case of a
Catonsville woman, Lurie Bormel, who had a housing discrimination
claim rejected by the Howard County Office of Human Rights.24 The
report correctly observed: "So far, multiple chemical sensitivity has pro-
duced a trickle of lawsuits and discrimination complaints, but a flood is
on its way."' E
C. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD") is another condition that
plaintiffs have claimed is caused by exposure to hazardous substances.
2 6
Courts that have become familiar with PTSD in the traumatic injury con-
text might be surprised to see its use in hazardous exposure cases. How-
ever, PTSD offers a vehicle for recovery for present emotional and
psychological damage that might otherwise be difficult to prove.
PTSD was re-defined recently by the American Psychiatric Association
in the fourth edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ("DSM-IV")
to require the satisfaction of several diagnostic criteria.27 These criteria
24. Mark Guidera, Housing Discrimination Case Rejected, BALT. SUN, July 15, 1994, at
B1. Ms. Bormel, a certified respiratory therapist, alleged that she could not work because
the managers of the condominium complex where she lived did not give her adequate
notice of spraying pesticides, herbicides, and other chemicals. Id. The Office of Human
Rights, however, concluded that the condominium management made reasonable attempts
to notify Ms. Bormel before spraying, and that the condominium association was looking
into switching to organic or other alternative lawn care materials. Id. Accordingly, the
Office concluded that there was insufficient evidence to continue with Ms. Bormel's hous-
ing discrimination case. Id.
The Baltimore Sun article also noted that Judge Smalkin of the Federal District Court
had dismissed a federal discrimination complaint filed by Ms. Bormel and the Department
of Housing and Urban Development against the Deering Woods Condominium in Colum-
bia. The opinion from this case is not available, and the newspaper gives no analysis of the
Judge's decision to dismiss the complaint.
25. Dresser, supra note 23, at 9C.
26. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
27. These criteria are:
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the fol-
lowing were present:
(1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or
events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat
to the physical integrity of self or others;
(2) the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror ....
B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or more) of the
following ways:
(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including
images, thoughts, or perceptions;....
(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event; ....
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differ from those as outlined in the DSM-III-R, the first edition of the
DSM to recognize a PTSD diagnosis.28 In particular, the DSM-IV scope
of the definition of the "stressor" or traumatic event necessary for a
PTSD diagnosis has been narrowed significantly.29
In addition to narrowing the circumstances under which a patient may
(3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a
sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative
flashback episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when
intoxicated);....
(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues
that symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event;
(5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that sym-
bolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of
general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or
more) of the following:
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the
trauma;
(2) efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of
the trauma
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma;
(4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities;
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others;
(6) restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings);
(7) sense of a foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career,
marriage, children, or a normal life span).
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as
indicated by two (or more) of the following:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep;
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger;
(3) difficulty concentrating;
(4) hypervigilance;
(5) exaggerated startle response.
E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D) is more than
one month.
F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 427-29 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
28. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d. ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
29. The former definition of "stressor" was:
A. The person has experienced an event that is outside the range of usual
human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, e.g.,
serious threat to one's life or physical integrity; serious threat or harm to one's
children, spouse, or other close relatives and friends; sudden destruction of one's
home or community; or seeing another person who has, recently been, or is being,
seriously injured or killed as the result of an accident or physical violence.
Id. at 250.
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be diagnosed with PTSD, the American Psychiatric Association also has
developed a new diagnosis for a condition named "Acute Stress Disor-
der" ("ASD"). ASD is a milder form of PTSD, involving the same stres-
sor but with fewer dissociative symptoms required for a diagnosis and
with a definitionally limited duration.3"
Because of its broader definition, ASD may appear to be a more at-
tractive option for plaintiffs seeking recovery for the alleged psychologi-
cal reaction to exposure to hazardous substances than PTSD as defined in
the DSM-IV. However, the four week duration set on this diagnosis
should limit its appeal to plaintiffs in toxic exposure lawsuits.
30. The diagnostic criteria for ASD are as follows:
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the fol-
lowing were present:
(1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or
events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat
to the physical integrity of self or others
(2) the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness or horror.
B. Either while experiencing or after experiencing the distressing event, the in-
dividual has three (or more) of the following dissociative symptoms:
(1) a subjective sense of numbing, detachment, or absence of emotional
responsiveness




(5) dissociative amnesia (i.e., inability to recall an important aspect of the
trauma).
C. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in at least one of the fol-
lowing ways: recurrent images, thoughts, dreams, illusions, flashback episodes, or
a sense of reliving the experience; or distress on exposure to reminders of the
traumatic event.
D. Marked avoidance of stimuli that arouse recollections of the trauma (e.g.,
thoughts, feelings, conversations, activities, places, or people).
E. Marked symptoms of anxiety or increased arousal (e.g., difficulty sleeping,
irritability, poor concentration, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, mo-
tor restlessness).
F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning or impairs the individual's
ability to pursue some necessary task, such as obtaining necessary assistance or
mobilizing personal resources by telling family members about the traumatic
experience.
G. The disturbance lasts for a minimum of 2 days and a maximum of 4 weeks
and occurs within 4 weeks of the traumatic event.
H. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance
(e.g., a drug abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition, is not better
accounted for by Brief Psychotic Disorder, and is not merely an exacerbation of a
preexisting Axis t or Axis II disorder.
DSM-IV, supra note 27, at 431-32.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Sterling v.
Velsicol Corporation, discussed the applicability of PTSD to hazardous
substances exposure litigation.31 The court analyzed PTSD under the
older, more liberal, diagnostic criteria of the DSM-IiI-R yet still deter-
mined that the district court had wrongly awarded damages.
Plaintiffs' drinking or otherwise using contaminated water, even
over an extended period of time, does not constitute the type of
recognizable stressor identified either by professional medical
organizations or courts. Examples of stressors upon which
courts have based awards for PTSD include rape, assault, mili-
tary combat, fires, floods, earthquakes, car and airplane crashes,
torture, and even internment in concentration camps, each of
which are natural or man-made disasters with immediate or ex-
tended violent consequences. Whereas consumption of contam-
inated water may be an unnerving occurrence, it does not rise to
the level of the type of psychologically traumatic event that is a
universal stressor.32
The DSM-IV definition of "stressor" will make it even more difficult
for a plaintiff to prevail on a PTSD theory in a hazardous substances ex-
posure case. This is not to say that such a diagnosis is impossible, how-
ever, and it is likely that courts will be dealing with the interplay between
PTSD, ASD, and hazardous substances for many years to come.
D. Increased Risk of Injury
Under this theory of recovery, plaintiffs assert a claim for a present
injury based on the prospect that they might suffer another injury in the
future. The theory of enhanced risk of future injury has been described
as "one of the most challenging causes of action [for a plaintiff] to
prove, 33 and is closely related to the "loss of chance" theory of
recovery.34
A plaintiff who sues under a theory of enhanced risk of future injury
alleges that because of exposure to a hazardous substance, his or her po-
tential for contracting a disease in the future is heightened. Furthermore,
the plaintiff asserts that he should be compensated now for the possible
future harm. Recovery under such a theory does not prevent the plaintiff
31. 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
32. Id. at 1210 (citations omitted).
33. Ellen Relkin, Emerging Damage Theories in Toxic Tort Actions, BRIEF, Spring
1992, at 48.
34. Howard Ross Feldman, Chances As Protected Interests: Recovery for the Loss of a
Chance and Increased Risk, 17 U. BALT. L. REV. 139, 139 (1987).
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from suing again if he or she, in fact, contracts the disease in the future.35
In order to recover for enhanced risk of future injury in Maryland,
however, a plaintiff must meet the Maryland standard for recovery of
damages based on future consequences of injury, as articulated in Pierce
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation.36 In' Pierce, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that recovery could only be had if the
consequences are reasonably probable or reasonably certain.
Such damages cannot be recovered if future consequences are
"mere possibilities." Probability exists when there is more evi-
dence in favor of a proposition than against it (a greater than
[fifty percent]. chance that a future consequence will occur).
Mere possibility exists when the evidence is anything less.
37
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized a cause of action based
on increased risk of future injury in Charlton Brothers Transportation
Company v. Garrettson,38 although not in the context of hazardous sub-
stances exposure.39 However, no court has cited this case in support of
the proposition that an increased risk of future injury will support a pres-
ent cause of action for almost fifty years. Accordingly, its precedential •
value, especially in the context of exposure to hazardous substances, is
doubtful at best.4° Moreover, the court's recognition of a cause of action
for an increase in risk that was less than fifty-one percent indicates that
35. One commentator has noted that "[any recovery received in the second action
would be discounted by damages received in the first action." Feldman, supra note 34, at
154 (citing Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts
Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, .90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1382 (1981)
(suggesting that "[c]ompensation should be calculated in a way that avoids double recovery
for the same injury") (emphasis added)). Why this result would obtain is unclear. If the
increased risk of future harm is a separate cause of action, it is not the same injury, and
therefore there is no question of double recovery. If the injury is the same, then the plain-
tiff should not be permitted to split the cause of action between currently manifested
heightened risk of injury and actual injury manifested in the future.
36. 464 A.2d 1020 (Md. 1983).
37. Id. at 1026 (citation omitted).
38. 51 A.2d 642, 646 (Md. 1947).
39. In Garrettson, the plaintiff sustained a hernia when the street car in which he was
riding collided with a truck. Id. at 644-45. Prior to the accident, the plaintiff had a 10%
chance of suffering a recurring hernia; after'the accident, the risk of a recurring hernia
increased to 50%, even if he submitted to what the court termed a "formidable" operation.
Id. at 646. The court of appeals held that the increased risk of suffering a recurring hernia
was a present injury for which the plaintiff could recover. Id. "This increase in hazard is
itself a permanent injury. Expert testimony hardly seems necessary to show that such an
operation would leave plaintiff in a permanently weaker condition." Id.
40. Feldman, however, states that this case constitutes precedent for the recognition of
a cause of action for increased risk. Feldman, supra note 34, at 158.
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Garrettson could not support this theory of recovery after Pierce.4'
E. Fear of Future Injury
The theory of recovery for a plaintiff's present fear of a future injury is
linked closely to the concept of recovery for an increased risk of injury.
However, the analysis of these two theories is not identical, and it is pos-
sible for a plaintiff to be unable to prove with sufficient probability that a
future injury will occur and yet still be able to recover for his or her pres-
ent fear that the injury will occur.
42
Present fear of future injury43 was analyzed recently by the Court of
Appeals in Maryland in Faya v. Almaraz." In Faya, two former patients
brought suit against a surgeon who operated on them without first in-
41. The court ruled that a 40% increase in probability that the hazard would occur, for
a total of 50% likelihood, was sufficient to constitute a permanent, and, by implication,
present injury. In fact, as discussed supra at text accompanying notes 36-37, the court of
appeals has held that a future circumstance must be "reasonably probable or reasonably
certain." Pierce, 464 A.2d at 1026. The court's own holding in Garrettson makes clear that
this standard was not met in that case, making it, at best, weak support for the proposition
that a plaintiff can recover for an increase in risk of injury. Garrettson, 51 A.2d at 646.
42. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1206 (6th Cir. 1988).
While there must be a reasonable connection between the injured plaintiff's
mental anguish and the prediction of a future disease, the central focus of a
court's inquiry in such a case is not on the underlying odds that the future disease
will in fact materialize. To this extent, mental anguish resulting from the chance
that an existing injury will lead to the materialization of a future disease may be
an element of recovery even though the underlying future prospect for suscepti-
bility to a future disease is not, in and of itself, compensable inasmuch as it is not
sufficiently likely to occur.
Id.
43. The "fear of future injury" issue also raises the issue of "phobia." The Sixth Cir-
cuit, in Velsicol, opined that "[c]ancerphobia is merely a specific type of mental anguish."
Id. at 1206 n.24. Others agree, using less neutral language. "While it appears to be an
entirely new development, in fact, cancerphobia is merely a branch of the garden-variety
emotional distress tort. Cancerphobia 'grew' from emotional distress just like the story
about the Little Shop of Horrors, where a man-eating monster 'grew' from a cute little
flower." Martha A. Churchill, Medical Monitoring and Cancerphobia - The Rise of Fear
Lawsuits, FOR THE DEF., Aug. 1993, at 2.
In fact, there clearly is a difference between the two concepts. "Fear" can be defined as
"an unpleasant often strong emotion caused by anticipation or awareness of danger."
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 453 (1986). By contrast, "phobia" can
be defined as "an exaggerated [(usually)] inexplicable and illogical fear of a particular ob-
ject or class of objects." Id. at 883. In simple terms, fear is a rational response to danger
while phobia is irrational. In the context of exposure to hazardous substances, plaintiffs
most often claim either AIDS phobia, when exposed to blood products, used hypodermic
needles, or other hospital waste, or cancerphobia, most often relating to exposure to asbes-
tos or carcinogenic chemicals.
44. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
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forming them that he had AIDS.45 The trial court dismissed both com-
plaints because the plaintiffs had failed to allege that the surgeon had
used improper barrier techniques. Accordingly, there was no transmis-
sion mechanism by which either patient could have been exposed to the
HIV virus.46
The court of appeals reversed, stating that:
[W]e cannot say that appellants' alleged fear of acquiring AIDS
was initially unreasonable as a matter of law, even though the
averments of the complaints did not identify any actual channel
of transmission of the AIDS virus .... [A] requirement that
plaintiffs must allege actual transmission would unfairly punish
them for lacking the requisite information to do SO.
4 7
The court stressed that the plaintiffs' fear must be reasonable.48
In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected a
test first articulated by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, in Burk v. Sage Products, Inc.49 In Burk, the
court held that a plaintiff who had been stuck by the needle of a dis-
carded syringe could not recover for his fear of contracting AIDS. The
court based its decision on the plaintiff's inability to show that the needle
had been used on a patient with AIDS. Furthermore, the plaintiff had
tested HIV-negative five times in the thirteen months since the
incident.50
The Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to follow the requirement
in Burk "that plaintiffs must allege actual transmission."'" In fact, the
Burk court merely required that a plaintiff demonstrate that he had been
exposed to the AIDS virus. Exposure is very different from "actual trans-
mission" and the court's misstated rationale could lead to many more
"fear of future injury" cases in the Maryland courts, especially in the con-
text of exposure to hazardous substances.
For example, the Burk court cited Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Insula-
45. Id. at 328.
46. Id. at 330-31.
47. Id. at 336-37.
48. Accordingly, the court noted that there is a 95% chance that one will test positive
for HIV contamination within six months after exposure, and held that, because the plain-
tiffs had tested negative for HIV more than one year after contact with the surgeon, they
could only recover for their fear of contracting AIDS from the time they first learned of
the surgeon's HIV status until the time they learned of their HIV-negative status. Id. at
337.
49. 747 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
50. Id. at 286-88.
51. Faya, 620 A.2d at 337.
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tion,52 where the plaintiff sued for damages based on her fear Of con-
tracting disease. The plaintiff alleged that she was exposed to a
hazardous substance when she inhaled the asbestos fibers on her hus-
band's work clothes.5 3 The Pennsylvania court held that the plaintiff
could not recover, noting that until she was able to allege physical injury
or a medically identifiable effect linked to her exposure to asbestos parti-
cles, her claim was not cognizable.54
In Maryland, under the holding of Faya, Cathcart presumably would
have been decided differently. Because a Maryland plaintiff no longer
must prove the mechanism whereby he or she has been exposed to a haz-
ardous substance, Maryland courts must anticipate numerous cases where
plaintiffs will attempt to determine the outer limits of the Faya decision.
55
Interestingly, the court in Faya did not resolve, or even address, the
issue of how a plaintiff who cannot prove a mechanism for transmission
of AIDS can satisfy the Pierce requirement that recovery of damages
based on future consequences of an injury "may be had only if such con-
sequences are reasonably probable or reasonably certain."56 A plaintiff
who cannot prove that he or she was exposed to a hazard, cannot prove
that it is reasonably probable or certain that he or she will suffer future
consequences. The court's silence on this issue leaves the Maryland trial
courts with no guidance in this area.
The Faya opinion has further significance in that it provides the most
recent articulation of the law in Maryland regarding the necessity for
physical injury when seeking emotional damages.
The Faya court began its analysis by noting that it was formerly the rule
that there could be no recovery of tort damages for mere fright or mental
suffering caused by negligence unconnected with physical impact or in-
52. 471 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
53. Id. at 508.
54. Id.
55. Although Faya is a case. involving exposure to AIDS and the HIV virus, the court
of appeals was well aware of the case's implications for other hazardous substance expo-
sure litigation. The court observed, in a footnote, that
[miost cases addressing the viability of claims alleging fear of contracting disease
concern exposure to asbestos, toxic chemicals, pesticides, and drug products.
These cases often rely on the first holding of Burk: in the absence of facts demon-
strating legitimate exposure to the disease-causing agent, there can be no
recovery.
Faya, 620 A.2d at 335 n.7. Any comfort that might be derived by the defense bar from this
remark, however, is tempered by the realization that it is precisely this holding from Burk
that the court declined to follow.
56. Pierce, 464 A.2d at 1026.
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jury.57 The court noted, however, that subsequent cases departed from
this rigid rule.5" The court then examined several cases that weakened
the "physical impact" rule, finally focusing on Vance v. Vance.5 9 In Vance,
the plaintiff, a woman married to the defendant in a religious ceremony,
sought a divorce decree after the defendant left her for another woman.
The defendant opposed the action on the grounds that he and the plaintiff
were never legally married because he had not received a final divorce
decree from his first wife prior to his "marriage" to the plaintiff.6"
The plaintiff had a negative reaction to this news:
She went into a state of shock, engaged in spontaneous crying
and for a period seemed detached and unaware of her own pres-
ence. She was unable to function normally, unable to sleep and
too embarrassed to socialize. In addition to experiencing symp-
toms of an ulcer, [plaintiff] suffered an emotional collapse and
depression which manifested itself in her external condition, i.e.,
her significantly deteriorated physical appearance-unkempt
hair, sunken cheeks and dark eyes.
61
From this evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiff had suffered an
objectively manifested, definite nervous disorder which was sufficient to
support a jury finding that she was physically injured as a foreseeable
result of the defendant's negligent misrepresentation concerning his mari-
tal status.62
Using Vance as an analogy, the Faya court concluded that the plaintiffs
who alleged symptoms of headache, sleeplessness, "and the physical and
financial sting of blood tests for the AIDS virus,"6 3 could recover for
their fear and mental and emotional distress. Thus, Faya teaches that the
act of drawing blood to perform diagnostic testing combined with the act
of paying for such testing is sufficient to meet Maryland's vestigial "physi-
cal impact" requirement. Distilled to its essence, the Faya opinion ap-
pears to eliminate the physical impact requirement in Maryland.
It is difficult to overstate the significance of Faya. Although this case
legitimately can be seen as being restricted to its facts, and viewed as an
exercise of judicial public policy, especially because it is an AIDS case, 6'
57. Faya, 620 A.2d at 337 (citations omitted).
58. Id. (citation omitted).
59. 408 A.2d 728 (Md. 1979).
60. Id. at 729.
61. Id. at 734.
62. Id. (citation omitted).
63. Faya, 620 A.2d at 338.
64. In fact, it is possible to read Faya as a case that stands for little more than the
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Faya can also be read as a case that dramatically expands the ability of a
plaintiff to recover for his or her fear of future injury after exposure to a
hazardous substance.
F. Medical Monitoring
Medical monitoring claims typically are brought when large groups of
individuals have been exposed to a toxic substance.65 The exposure can
be occupational66 or environmental.67 Because the exposure to toxic sub-
stances typically has been experienced by a relatively large group of indi-
viduals, medical monitoring relief usually is sought pursuant to class
action certification. 68 Courts have certified such classes when the defend-
ant's liability clearly has been established, when the disease process has a
long latency period, and when a prudent physician would order prevent-
ative testing in order to detect and treat the full-blown disease at its earli-
est manifestation.
69
Although medical monitoring is thought of as equitable relief, and
medical monitoring classes traditionally are sought under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), the so-called "equitable class" provi-
sion,7° the proper theory of recovery is more complicated. Most state
courts that have looked at the medical monitoring issue have analyzed
the recovery in terms of measure of damages, awarded after a finding of
liability after proof of an underlying tort.71 It is a well-established princi-
proposition that physicians, and health care providers generally, should disclose their HIV
status to patients prior to providing them with care.
65. Although toxic exposure cases constitute the traditional medical monitoring scena-
rio, plaintiffs are bringing such actions in the product liability context as well. See, e.g., In
re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., Accufix Atrial "J" Leads Prod. Liab. Litig., 164
F.R.D. 222 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (certifying medical monitoring class for pacemaker lead im-
plantees); In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., Accufix Atrial "J" Leads Prod. Liab.
Litig., 168 F.R.D. 203 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (decertifying medical monitoring class).
66. See, e.g., Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
67. Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
68. See, e.g., Day, 851 F. Supp. at 869.
69. Id. at 880.
70. See, e.g., In re NLO, Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 159 (6th Cir. 1993).
71. See, e.g., Fried v. Sungard Recovery Servs., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 315, 377 (E.D. Pa.
1996); Thomas v. Fags Bearings Corp., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1994); Potter v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550, 578 (1993); Ball v. Joy Mfg., 755 F.
Supp. 1344, 1371 (S.D. W. Va. 1990), affd 958 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1033 (1992); Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28 (Ariz. App. 1988), review dis-
missed, 781 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. 1989); Riche v. City of Baton Rouge, 541 So. 2d 905 (La. App.
1988); Ayers, 525 A.2d at 312; Fleming v. Knowles, 130 So. 2d 326 (Ala. 1961).
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pie that damages are legal, not equitable, in nature,72 and where the dam-
ages remedy is adequate, the courts should not grant equitable relief.
73
Confronted with this problem, courts have declined to certify medical
monitoring classes under Rule 23(b)(2). 4
Courts are still grappling with some of the implications of medical
monitoring relief. In particular, given the prohibition against splitting
causes of action in many states, seeking relief for medical monitoring dur-
ing the latency of a disease process may preclude a plaintiff from later
seeking recovery for the injuries caused by a manifested disease. 75 Be-
cause medical monitoring relief has the potential to cut-off further at-
tempts at recovery later, counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants should
be alert to the potential implications of an attempt to recover under a
medical monitoring theory.
A plaintiff who seeks the remedy of medical monitoring typically must
establish 1) significant exposure to a hazardous substance that was
wrongfully caused by the defendant; 2) an increased risk of contracting a
serious disease; 3) that periodic diagnostic examinations are reasonable
and necessary because of the increased risk; and 4) that monitoring will
be helpful in facilitating early detection and treatment.76
Courts that have rejected a cause of action for medical monitoring typi-
cally have done so on the basis of an absence of present injury77 or be-
cause a plaintiff has failed to show a reasonable probability that injury
will occur.78 These same rationales for denying medical monitoring re-
covery were rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the seminal
medical monitoring case, Ayers v. Jackson Township.7 9
In Ayers, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the use of court-
supervised funds to administer medical-surveillance payments in mass
72. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opp. Comm'n v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301
(6th Cir. 1975).
73. Schoental v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92 (1932).
74. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), over-
ruled on other grounds, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) "[C]ertification of the medical monitor-
ing claim in this case under Rule 23(b)(2) would infringe on the constitutional right to a
jury trial. The court cannot and will not infringe on that inviolate right." Id. at 552.
75. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 862 n.25 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied sub nor., General Elec. Co. v. Knight, 499 U.S. 961 (1991).
76. Paoli, 916 F.2d at 852.
77. See, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Vroom, 480 So. 2d 108, 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Ball v. Joy Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D. W. Va. 1990).
78. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 274 Cal. Rptr. 885, 891 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990).
79. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
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toxic exposure cases was an appropriate exercise of the court's equitable
powers. 8 In particular, the court noted that if an individual was exposed
to toxic chemicals, an early diagnosis could lead to improved prospects
for cure, prolongation of life, relief of pain, and minimization of disabil-
ity.8 ' In addition, the court held that it would be inequitable for an indi-
vidual who wrongfully was exposed to dangerous toxic chemicals, but
who was unable to prove that he likely would contract a disease, to be
equipped to pay his own expenses when medical intervention was reason-
able and necessary.82
The state of a medical monitoring claim in Maryland is open to inter-
pretation. On the one hand, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has not
overtly recognized a cause of action for medical monitoring. Indeed, one
commentator has stated that
Maryland courts have ... held loyal to traditional tort doctrine
in restricting the viability of toxic tort claims. Given the difficul-
ties in establishing probability of harm as a prerequisite to any
remedy, no matter how progressive, it seems unlikely that the
remedy of medical surveillance damages will be welcome in this
jurisdiction in the near future.83
On the other hand, a year after the above statement was written, the
court of appeals handed down its decision in Faya. 4 In that case, the
plaintiffs were allowed to recover for the expense of testing for the HIV
virus.85 Although the court did not explicitly recognize it as such, this
was recovery for medical monitoring. The plaintiffs' recovery in Faya was
limited to the testing necessary to confirm, with ninety-five percent accu-
racy, that they would not become infected with the HIV virus.86 Such a
limitation could be interpreted, however, to mean only that further test-
ing would not be reasonable or necessary, and that further testing would
not aid in the early warning and treatment of health problems. Accord-
ingly, in a disease process with a latency period measured in years rather
than months, Faya could be used to support testing over the entire latency
period.
It is unclear whether the court of appeals was fully aware of the impli-
80. Id. at 314 (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 304.
82. Id. at 312.
83. John J. Kalas, Medical Surveillance Damages in Toxic Tort Litigation: A Half
Hearted Embrace, 2 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 126, 144 (1992).
84. 620 A.2d at 327.
85. Id. at 338-39.
86. Id. at 337.
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cations of the Faya opinion when it was decided. It is certain, however,
that the Maryland courts will be given many opportunities to define the
parameters of that opinion in the years to come, and medical monitoring
will be one of the issues at the forefront of that debate.
III. PROOF OF CAUSATION
Having identified the theories under which he may wish to pursue re-
lief, the plaintiff must then decide how to go about proving causation.
This is the most difficult burden for plaintiffs to overcome in toxic tort
litigation.87
Ordinarily, proof of causation requires the establishment of a
sufficient nexus between the defendant's conduct and the plain-
tiffs injury. In toxic tort cases, the task of proving causation is
invariably made more complex because of the long latency pe-
riod of illnesses caused by carcinogens or other toxic chemicals.
The fact that ten or twenty years or more may intervene be-
tween the exposure and the manifestation of disease highlights
the practical difficulties encountered in the effort to prove cau-
sation. Moreover, the fact that segments of the entire popula-
tion are afflicted by cancer and other toxically-induced diseases
requires plaintiffs, years after their exposure, to counter the ar-
gument that other intervening exposures or forces were the
"cause" of their injury. 8
Issues arising from a plaintiff's attempt to meet his burden of proving
causation, and a defendant's attempt to discredit such proof, form the
basis for the second half of this Article. In particular, the standards of
proof required to make a prima facie case of exposure to hazardous sub-
stances are discussed. Finally, the importance of expert testimony, the
appropriate standard for admissibility, and the types of experts and the
studies upon which they rely, are analyzed.
A. Standards of Proof
To establish causation, a plaintiff must prove that an identifiable haz-
ardous substance caused his or her injuries. The Maryland courts use sev-
eral standards of proof to determine whether a plaintiff has met his
burden.
87. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 301 (citation omitted).
88. Id.
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1. Substantial Factor
Maryland has adopted the "substantial factor" test as the standard by
which a plaintiff's causation evidence must be evaluated.89 This test is
derived from section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.9"
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has applied the "substantial factor"
test in the asbestos setting for cases involving bystanders who were not
direct users of the hazardous product.9 ' The court noted that in such a
case, the test is fact specific to each individual's case, requiring an under-
standing of the interrelationship between the use of the product in the
workplace and the plaintiff's activities in the workplace.92
This requires an understanding of the physical characteristics of
the workplace and of the relationship between the activities of
the direct users of the product and the bystander plaintiff....
Within that context, the factors to be evaluated include the na-
ture of the product, the frequency of its use, the proximity, in
distance and in time, of a plaintiff to the use of a product, and
the regularity of the exposure of that plaintiff to the use of that
product.93
89. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, 604 A.2d 445 (Md. 1992); Robin
Express Transfer, Inc. v. Canton R.R., 338 A.2d 335 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
90. Section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides as follows:
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner
in which his negligence has resulted in the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
Comment (a) to section 431 expands on this definition:
The word "substantial" is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has
such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a
cause, using that word in a popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of
responsibility, rather than in the so-called "philosophic sense" which includes
every one of the great number of events without which any happening would not
have occurred. Each of these events is a cause in the so-called "philosophic
sense," yet the effect of many of them is so insignificant that no ordinary mind
would think of them as causes.
Id. § 431 cmt. a.
91. Eagle-Picher, 604 A.2d at 459. In this case, the court of appeals includes an alter-
native formulation of the substantial factor rule from Prosser:
When the conduct of two or more actors is so related to an event that their com-
bined conduct, viewed as a whole, is a but-for cause of the event, and application
of the but-for rule to them individually would absolve all of them, the conduct of
each is a cause in fact of the event.
Id. at n.11.
92. Id. at 460.
93. Id. (citations omitted).
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The "substantial factor" test has been criticized as an insufficient stan-
dard to measure the relevance or sufficiency of evidence. 94
Where the "but for" test clearly addresses the kind of relation-
ship the law requires between an alleged cause and an alleged
effect, the "substantial factor" test provides no guidance at all
on this question. It was originally formulated to clarify proxi-
mate cause analysis, and its misuse in determining cause-in-fact
is both unnecessary and ironic.95
2. Significant but Unquantifiable Risk
Where a plaintiff cannot define with specificity the dose necessary to
make a substance harmful, courts have adopted the concept of "signifi-
cantly but unquantifiably enhanced risk" in order to permit litigation to
94. Bert Black et al., Unravelling Causation: Back to the Basics, 7 Toxic L. REP.
(BNA) 1061, 1062 (1993).
95. Id. As an example of the "but for" test, Black proposes the following hypothetical:
[I]f a man and a woman fire rifles simultaneously and negligently, and both of
their bullets strike another person in the heart, the woman could claim her shot
caused no harm because the victim would have died anyway. The man could
make the same argument, meaning both, defendants would escape liability.
Id. (footnote omitted).
It is this flaw in the "but for" test which, Black argues, led to the development of the
"substantial factor" test. Black contends however, that a simple amendment to the "but
for" test would permit its use without recourse to the inadequate "substantial factor" test:
One only need ask about each hunter whether it would have been necessary to
eliminate his or her rifle shot for the plaintiff to have avoided death. Because
either bullet would have been fatal by itself, the answer in each case would be
"yes," making both the man and the woman causes-in-fact. Though the grammar
may be clunky and unwieldy, the logic of the "reverse but for" test is quite clear.
Id. The effect of the adoption of this test instead of the "substantial factor" test can be
seen by applying both tests to the facts of Eagle-Picher. In that case, expert witnesses
testified that:
"[AIli of [the] exposures to asbestos were a significant contributing causal factor
to the mesothelioma," because the causation is "cumulative." ... Thus, the fail-
ure to warn on the part of any one supplier of an asbestos product to which a
decedent was exposed can operate as a concurrent proximate cause with the fail-
ures to warn on the part of other such suppliers.
Eagle-Picher, 604 A.2d at 459.
Accordingly, the "substantial factor" test was satisfied. However, under the "reverse but
for" test, it would not have been necessary to eliminate a specific manufacturer's asbestos-
carrying product for the plaintiff to have avoided death, because exposure is cumulative,
and there is no evidence to indicate that the plaintiff would not have been exposed to a
sufficient quantity of asbestos to have caused him to contract mesothelioma in any case.
Accordingly, under the "substantial factor" test, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to
conclude that Eagle's activities were a proximate cause of the decedent's injuries. Under
the "reverse but for" test, there was not.
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proceed.96 For example, in Merry v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.," the
court acknowledged that plaintiffs' experts had not, and could not, quan-
tify the, plaintiffs' chances of contracting an exposure-related disease. 9s
Nonetheless, the court held that the plaintiffs could escape summary
judgement. 99 Citing the plaintiffs' expert's conclusion that a medical
monitoring program would be prudent based on the documented and
"reasonably presumed" exposure to toxic substances, the court held that
the plaintiffs had created an issue of fact as to the probability of con-
tracting a serious illness.100 "It would be reasonable for a jury to con-
clude that the plaintiffs have a significantly but unquantifiably enhanced
risk of serious disease and that such enhanced risk of disease justifies
periodic medical examinations."'0 1
In order to meet the "substantial factor" test, it is necessary that a
plaintiff first prove that the substance to which he or she was exposedwas
hazardous or toxic. This task is at once simpler and more complex than
might first be apparent.
On one level, proof of a product's toxicity is extremely simple as every-
thing is toxic to some degree.0 2 In fact, the truly relevant question is
whether the dose of the substance under consideration was sufficiently
large as to be harmful or poisonous.' 0 3
The concept of a significant but unquantifiably enhanced risk is diffi-
cult to accept.'0 4 If one cannot quantify the enhanced risk, how can one
be sure that the risk is significant or was a "substantial factor" in causing
plaintiff's injury? The rationale behind this concept, the "one-hit" theory,
provides that "there is no quantity of a carcinogen that a'person can be
exposed to without incurring some increased risk."' 5 Although this may
96. See also Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847, 850 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
See also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 852 (3d Cir. 1990).




101. Id. at 851-52.
102. Paracelus, a Renaissance physician and alchemist, first articulated the maxim: "All
things are poisonous, for there is nothing without poisonous qualities. It is only the dose
which makes the thing a poison." Scott P. DeVries, Effective Cross-Examination of Plain-
tiffs' Toxicologists and Immunologists in Mass Toxic Tort Litigation, 4 Toxic L. REP.
(BNA) 818, 819 (1989).
103. Id.
104. At least one commentator has termed the concept a "contradiction in terms."
John Endicott, Toxic Torts by the Numbers: Quantitative Risk Assessment in Chemical Ex-
posure Litigation, 6 Toxic L. REP. (BNA) 407, 408 (1991).
105. Merry, 684 F. Supp. at 851. See also Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1433
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be true, the issue should not be whether one molecule of a carcinogen can
cause cancer or whether exposure to such a molecule causes some in-
creased risk, but rather, whether that risk is legally significant. This issue,
unresolved by the "one-hit" theory, is crucial when the numbers them-
selves are considered.
[T]here are a lot of numbers for increased risk that are greater
than zero but that no one in their right mind would consider
"significant." Three examples of such numbers would be one
octillionth, two octillionths, and three octillionths. Even jump-
ing many orders of magnitude closer to 1.0 (certainty)-all the
way to, say, a one-in-a-trillion increased lifetime risk of incur-
ring cancer from a given dose of chemicals-one still is surely in
the range of risk that is insignificant as a matter of law.. ., since
a' one-in-a-trillion risk equates to a risk that one extra person
somewhere on earth exposed to such a dose will incur cancer
sometime in the next 100 generations of humans, assuming that
the global population approximately triples to a figure of fifteen
billion by about the year 4,500 A.D. It seems indisputable that a
plaintiff's expert who is unable or unwilling to quantify the
greater-than-zero increased risk implied by the "one-hit" theory
cannot possibly claim to know whether the value for such al-
leged increased risk lies above or below the level of legal insig-
nificance, whether that level be one in a trillion, or some higher
or lower number.
106
Despite the logical and legal problems inherent in the "significant but
unquantifiably enhanced risk" standard, the Maryland Court of Appeals
has adopted this standard for use in asbestos cases.107 There is no reason
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989) (The "one-hit" theory "suggests that one mole-
cule of carcinogen in the right place and at the right time, can cause cancer.").
106. Endicott, supra note 104, at 408-09. Endicott includes, in a footnote, a revealing
example of how the "one-hit" theory can be attacked in a courtroom:
When we pressed plaintiffs' toxicologists on cross-examination to quantify the
plaintiffs' additional risk of cancer, they responded that quantification was not
possible. Pressed further, they admitted they could not say whether the added risk
was more or less than one-in-a-million. As every one of us has a one-in-three
chance of contracting cancer in his or her lifetime, an added risk of one-in-a-
million merely increases the total risk from .333333 to .333334. hardly anything
worthy of note. Placing the .333333 on the blackboard and then erasing the last 3
and replacing it with a 4 was embarrassing to the plaintiffs' witness.
John Munter & Scott DeVries, Higgins v. Aerojet Corp.: Successfully Defending a Toxic
Tort Case, 1 Toxic L. REP. (BNA) 874, 876 (1987), quoted in Endicott, supra note 104, at
409.
107. Eagle-Picher, 604 A.2d at 459 ("The defendants' medical expert also believed that
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to believe that the court would not also endorse the standard in other
hazardous substances cases.
3. Product Identification
Before a plaintiff can recover damages for exposure to a hazardous
substance, the plaintiff must be able to identify the hazardous substance
to which he or she was exposed. Indeed, product identification has been
described as "[t]he threshold requirement of any products liability ac-
tion."10 8 In McClelland v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,109 Judge
Smalkin of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
held that the plaintiffs, who had sued Goodyear for its allegedly tortious
conduct in furnishing various toxic chemicals to Kelly Springfield, their
employer, could not prevail as a matter of law. Magistrate Chasanow
reviewed the parties' filings and concluded that plaintiffs presented no
evidence that their injuries were caused by any particular, identifiable,
Goodyear-supplied chemical. Judge Smalkin agreed:
Plaintiffs' attempts to hold Goodyear responsible, under prod-
uct liability theories, for the total "toxic soup" they claim existed
in their workplace, without the ability to adduce competent evi-
dence that a reasonable fact-finder could view as showing a
greater than 50% chance of a causal connection between any
such product and the specific injuries they allegedly suffered,
must fail. Maryland has not adopted the "market-share" theory
of product liability, of which the plaintiffs here assert a micro-
cosmic variant. Thus, the court concludes that the plaintiffs
must suffer summary judgment on their product liability
claims.110
In Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, a plaintiff attempted to estab-
lish the liability of an installer of asbestos products (the Porter Hayden
Company, or "Porter") by proving that the installer was "almost an exclu-
sive distributor" for Johns-Manville ("Manville") products, which con-
tained asbestos."n Although the plaintiff was able to show both that
Porter sold Manville products and that the plaintiff's place of employ-
ment purchased Manville products, the court held that more direct evi-
a person [would have to] reach an undefined 'threshold' of asbestos exposure before expo-
sure w[ould] cause mesothelioma.").
108. Roberts v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 726 F. Supp. 172, 174 (W.D. Mich.
1989).
109. 735 F. Supp. 172 (D. Md. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1991).
110. McClelland, 735 F. Supp. at 174.
111. Eagle-Picher, 604 A.2d at 462.
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dence was required. This ruling reversed the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals which had held that the jury reasonably could have inferred that
"any Johns-Manville products identified at [plaintiffs place of employ-
ment] were Porter Hayden products."
'1 12
In Eagle-Picher, the Court of Appeals of Maryland also rejected the
"fiber drift" theory as a possible theory of exposure.
"The 'fiber drift theory' as it is described by the plaintiffs here
takes as its starting point that asbestos fibers may become air-
borne or re-entrained and thus be carried from their source to
other areas. Under this theory, however, both the specific locale
of the product's use and the specific areas of the plaintiff's em-
ployment become irrelevant. The substance of the fiber drift
theory is that once an asbestos-containing product can be placed
anywhere in the Firestone plant, any plaintiff working at any
point within that plant is entitled to have the question of causa-
tion submitted to the jury because it is likely, given that fibers
can drift, that a given plaintiff was exposed to fibers originating
in a particular defendant's product." So extremely attenuated is
causation in fact under the 'fiber drift theory' that it is inconsis-
tent with the requirement of Maryland law that an actor's negli-
gence be a substantial factor in causing the injury.113
Although the court of appeals did not cast its holding in terms of product
identification, the logic of this portion of the Eagle-Picher case requires
that a plaintiff be able to prove with specificity that a particular manufac-
turer's product caused his or her injury.
4. Proof of Exposure
Before deciding whether or not an identifiable hazardous substance
was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs injuries, proof of exposure to
the hazardous substance is required. "Exposure ... may be established
circumstantially."' 14 Whether exposure, no matter how it is established,
is sufficient to permit a jury to find substantial factor causation is a ques-
tion specific to the facts of each individual case.
The finding involves the interrelationship between the use of a
defendant's product at the workplace and the activities of the
plaintiff at the workplace. This requires an understanding of the
112. Id. (quoting Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc. v. Balbos, 578 A.2d 228, 241 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1990)).
113. Eagle-Picher, 604 A.2d at 463 (quoting Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d
360, 376 (3d Cir. 1990)).
114. Eagle-Picher, 604 A.2d at 460 (citation omitted).
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physical characteristics of the workplace and of the relationship
between the activities of the direct users of the product and the
bystander plaintiff. . . . Within that context, the factors to be
evaluated include the nature of the product, the frequency of its
use, the proximity in distance and time of a plaintiff to the use of
a product, and the regularity of the exposure of that plaintiff to
the use of that product.'
15
In Eagle-Picher, the court of appeals provided several examples of
cases in which exposure was established. The Eagle-Picher court held
that where a plaintiff could establish that he had worked in an engine
room (the area of the most dense concentration of asbestos) for six
months in the vicinity of asbestos installers who used "tons"' 16 of defend-
ant's cement, exposure was proved." 7
5. Expert Testimony
In order to prove causation, a plaintiff must offer the testimony of at
least one expert witness. The rest of this Article discusses the varying
theories of proof with which the expert should be familiar, the threshold
standard for admitting the expert's testimony into evidence, the various
fields of expertise, and the types of studies relied on by experts in the
field of hazardous substance exposure.
IV. THEORIES OF PROOF
Scientists and lawyers think very differently about the issue of proof of
causation. Although the legal standard clearly applies ifi the legal setting,
and although expert witnesses should be familiar with legal, as opposed
to scientific, theories of proof of causation, the contrast between the two
disciplines can lead to a lack of clarity in the testimony. A basic under-
standing of the theoretical underpinnings of the two theories of causation
can help to dispel any confusion that might arise.""
The paradigmatic scientific method uses inductive reasoning, making a
generalized conclusion from specific empirical observation. Under this
paradigm,
knowledge is gained by attempting to disprove or falsify a hy-
115. Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 461.
117. Id.
118. A full treatment of this complex issue is beyond the limited scope of this Article.
For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Brennan, supra note 2. This section of the Article
owes a great deal to Brennan's article.
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pothesis based on empirical investigation. Scientific methodol-
ogy today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to
see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what dis-
tinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.... -Theo-
retically, therefore, hypotheses are not affirmatively proved,
only falsified. . . . Of course, if a hypothesis repeatedly with-
stands falsification, one may tend to accept it, even if condition-
ally, as true. 119
By contrast, the law uses primarily deductive, or empirical, reasoning,
for example, a negligent act that causes damage results in liability. Of
course, there are an infinite number of "causes" for damage. For exam-
ple, if X is driving a car and, through his negligence, strikes Y, X's negli-
gence is the cause of Y's injury. However, the fact of the manufacture of
X's car is also a "cause" of Y's injury, even though that manufacture was
non-negligent, as is the fact that X's parents conceived him. Indeed,
under this rationale, Y's conception was also a "cause" of his injury.'2 °
No one would advocate extending liability to all who were involved
because each was a potential "cause" of Y's damages. In order to limit
the potentially infinite causal chain that could stretch out from each al-
leged tort, the law developed the concept of "proximate cause. ,121
Under this concept, the factfinder must determine if the alleged conduct.
was "so significant and important a cause that the defendant should be
legally responsible.'
122
Although inductive theories of proof work well for scientists, and de-
ductive theories of proof work well for lawyers, problems develop when
the two concepts are forced to intersect in the court room. Viewed from
an inductive, or scientific, standpoint, it is almost nonsensical to speak in
119. Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Sub-
stances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L.
REV. 643, 645 (1992).
120. The reductio ad absurdum of the causative chain analysis in the law is found in
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)..
121. The word "proximate" is a legacy of Lord Chancellor Bacon, who in his time
committed other sins. The word means nothing more than near or immediate;
and when it was first taken up by the courts it had connotations of proximity in
time and space which have long since disappeared. It is an unfortunate word,
which places an entirely wrong emphasis upon the factor of physical or mechani-
cal closeness. For this reason "legal cause" or perhaps even "responsible cause"
would be a more appropriate term. There is, however, no present prospect that
long ingrained practice will ever be altered by the substitution of either.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 273 (5th
ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
122. Id.
19971
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terms of "reasonable scientific certainty." What is reasonable? What is
certain? These are not scientific terms. It may be reasonable to say that
particular results point towards a possible conclusion, but is this reason-
able certainty? On the other hand, lawyers have little time for scientific
doubt-either a particular dose of a chemical is toxic or it is not. The law
requires, if not certainty, then reasonable probability, and cannot, or
should not, indulge itself by living in a state of perpetual doubt.
12 3
The problem with this pragmatic approach to issues of proof of causa-
tion comes when experts testify about matters where no reliable evidence
points to a strong association between a product and an injury. For ex-
ample, an expert who testifies that a plaintiff has a significant but unquan-
tifiable increase in risk of cancer because of exposure to a hazardous
substance arguably meets neither the scientific nor legal standard neces-
sary to support the plaintiff's case. In such a case, "there is a risk that the
jury would make an irrational finding of causation based upon the siren-
like allure of opinions stated by highly qualified experts.' 1 4 Accord-
ingly, the importance of a threshold determination of the admissibility of
an expert's testimony is crucial to a fair determination of liability.
123. Judge Joseph H. Young of the federal bench attempted to resolve this "proof"
dichotomy.
[E]vidence or absolute scientific "certainty" may be impossible for either plain-
tiffs or defendant to obtain in a products liability case of this nature, as it is diffi-
cult to isolate one of a variety of factors which may have caused an injury.
Further, proof of causation must be presented in scientific and medical terms,
which may be misinterpreted in a legal setting. For example, reliable evidence of
a strong association between a product and an injury may lead a reasonable juror
to conclude that a causal relationship is "more probable than not," even though
the expert witness never mentioned causation and only testified to an "associa-
tion." Nevertheless, when presenting evidence of an association, just as with any
other expert testimony, there must be some basis beyond mere theory and specu-
lation for the opinion.
Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087, 1093 (D. Md. 1986) (citation omitted).
124. Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1335, 1345 (S.D. Ind. 1992). A less
flattering view of expert testimony has been offered by Judge Weinstein:
An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no
matter how frivolous, thus validating the case sufficiently to avoid summary judg-
ment and force the matter to trial. At the trial itself an expert's testimony can be
used to obfuscate what would otherwise be a simple case. The most tenuous fac-
tual bases are sufficient to produce firm opinions to a high degree of "medical (or
other expert) probability" or even of "certainty." Juries and judges can be, and
sometimes are, misled by the expert-for-hire.
Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 473, 482 (1986).
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A. The Continued Viability of the Frye/Reed Test
The evidentiary world of the federal courts was thrown into confusion
by the Supreme Court in the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'25 Maryland has avoided such trauma, and there is
no indication that the court of appeals will reject the familiar standard for
the admissibility of expert testimony first enunciated in Frye v. United
States,126 and adopted in Maryland in Reed v. State.'
27
The Reed standard requires an expert's methodology to be "generally
accepted as reliable within the expert's particular scientific field' 128 to be
admissible. This "methodology" standard has been criticized,'129 but in
Maryland it is unlikely to be altered.' 30
The Daubert standard, by contrast, requires the court to engage in what
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has termed:
a difficult, two-part analysis. First, we must determine nothing
less than whether the experts' testimony reflects "scientific
knowledge," whether their findings are "derived by the scientific
method," and whether their work product amounts to "good sci-
ence." . . . Second, we must ensure that the proposed expert
testimony is "relevant to the task at hand .... " i.e., that it logi-
cally advances a material aspect of the proposing party's case. 3 '
There is a "common perception that Daubert liberalized the standard for
admission of expert testimony. "132 Surprisingly, more than half the cases
125. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
126. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
127. 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978). See Keene Corp. v. Hall, 626 A.2d 997,997 n.2 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1993) ("[T]here is nothing in Maryland case law ... that indicates that the
Court of Appeals is considering [a move to the Daubert standard]."). Keene also formally
resolved the issue of Reed's applicability in a civil case in the affirmative. Id. at 1002.
128. Reed, 391 A.2d at 368.
129. See, e.g., John Endicott, Quack Medicine and Tort Litigation: The Scientific Method
or "Methodology?", 7 Toxic L. REP. (BNA) 288, 291 (1992).
130. This standard also can prove difficult for the ill-prepared expert as the following
question and answer illustrate:
Q: "Do you have a methodology or protocol for reaching determinations as to whether
a particular agent is a human teratogen?"
A: "No."
Smith v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1561, 1580 n.72 (N.D. Ga. 1991), quoted in
Endicott, supra note 129, at 291 n.3. Summary judgment was granted based on this answer.
Id.
131. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations
ommitted). The first prong of the Daubert test is, in essence, the Frye test restated.
132. Jonathan M. Hoffman, Expert Testimony since Daubert: A Major Shift, 9 Toxic L.
REP. (BNA) 252, 252 (1994).
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involving the admissibility of expert testimony reported during the year
after Daubert was decided excluded the challenged expert testimony.1
33
Although the Daubert standard has not been adopted in Maryland, at
least one Maryland court has utilized a Daubert-type analysis in a case
involving MCSS. In Bready v. G.D. Armstrong,34 Judge Durke G.
Thompson was confronted with a motion in limine from defendants seek-
ing to bar reference to MCSS as well as the testimony of two doctors who
proposed to testify that the plaintiff suffered from MCSS. The plaintiff's
attorney requested that the court accept the Daubert criteria. 135 The de-
fendant agreed that although the Frye/Reed test was still valid in Mary-
land, the Daubert factors might be considered by the court in a case
involving cutting-edge science.136
Judge Thompson resolved the dispute by finding that the Frye standard
had not been abandoned in Maryland. 37 Judge Thompson stated that "it
is appropriate to incorporate the Frye rule into what the court finds is a
more useful functional rule as encompassed by the Dalbert [sic] Supreme
Court ruling.' 138 The court held that under either test, however, there
was insufficient agreement within the scientific community to permit tes-
133. Id.
134. Civ. No. 77747 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery Co.) (Apr. 14, 1995).
135. Mr. Nelson [for the plaintiff]: "I think what Dalbert [sic.] is really driving at is they
are not going to permit a witness - I mean, basically under the Frye - under the old rule,
the very conservative rule, the courtroom was always a generation or half a generation
behind the science. And what Dalbert [sic] is saying is, well, that is not really fair; is it? If
someone is injured and they can prove it?" Transcript of Motions Hearing, April 14, 1995,
at 9-10.
136. Id. at 13.. There was some dissension between defense counsel on this point. "[T]o
answer the Court's question, I think that the standard that the Court has to apply currently
is the Frye/Reed standard" Id. at 22.
137. Judge Thompson's lesson is confirmed by the Maryland Rules of Evidence
adopted by the court of appeals on December 15, 1993, effective in Maryland since July 1,
1994. Rule 5-702, "Testimony by Experts," provides that:
Expert testimony may be admitted in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the
court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In making that determination, the court
shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert tes-
timony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis exists
to support the expert testimony.
The Committee Note to Rule 5-702 makes clear that the rule is not intended to overrule
the Frye/Reed test. "The required scientific foundation for the admission of novel scientific
techniques or principles is left to development through case law." Committee Note to
Rule 5-702, cf., Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978), with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
138. Id. at 31.
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timony about MCSS and its causal connection to the plaintiff's claims of
damages. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant's motion in
limine.1
39
The lesson of Bready appears to be that, while Frye/Reed is still the
appropriate evidentiary standard in Maryland, attorneys will raise
Daubert in an attempt to persuade courts that cutting-edge type evidence
should be admitted. Because Daubert, arguably, incorporates Frye/Reed,
it is possible for a court to make a ruling that combines the two standards
if the final result is the exclusion of the proposed testimony. Admitting
testimony under Daubert that would be inadmissible under Frye/Reed,
however, is a practice which currently has no support under Maryland
law.
B. Areas of Expertise
Courts are confronted with an array of separate areas of expertise in
cases involving exposure to hazardous substances. The most commonly
offered areas of expertise, howeVer, are epidemiology and toxicology.
1. Epidemiology
The ultimate goal of epidemiology is:
to draw a biological inference concerning the relationship of [a]
factor [for example, a toxic substance] to [a] disease's etiology
and/or its natural history. Stated more formally, "epidemiology
can be regarded as a sequence of reasoning concerned with bio-
logical inferences derived from observations of disease occur-
rence and related phenomena in human population groups. "140
Epidemiologists141 have a set of criteria that must be satisfied prior to
139. Id. at 35-36.
140. Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 750-51 (1984) (quoting A. LILIENFELD & D. LILIENFELD, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 4 (2d ed. 1980) (footnote omitted)). Less formally,
"[e]pidemiologists in toxic tort cases perform two primary tasks: they analyze available
data in an attempt to draw an association between exposure to a chemical and the resultant
disease, and they attempt to draw biological inferences from that data to plaintiffs and
plaintiffs' claimed diseases." G. Marc Whitehead & Larry D. Espel, Legal Proof of Causa-
tion in Toxic Tort Litigation, 2 Toxic L. REP. (BNA) 1040, 1043 (1988).
141. An epidemiologist often is referred to as a doctor who can count. In fact, however,
a medical degree is not necessary for expertise in the area of epidemiology. Black &
Lilienfeld, supra note 146, at 776. (Although more than 10 years old, this article is still an
invaluable source for information on the relationship between epidemiology and litigation.
For another, more recent, resource intended specifically for judges, see FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994). Although emphasizing
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an inference that an agent is the "etiologic agent of a given disease."
142
These criteria, the Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates, for the two scientists
who developed them in the nineteenth century, and Evans, who revised
them in 1976, form the backbone of every epidemiological inference.
1 43
An epidemiologist now can draw an inference regarding the etiological
relationship between an agent and a disease after satisfying the Henle-
Koch-Evans Postulates. This alone is not sufficient to permit the epide-
miologist to testify at a trial involving hazardous substance exposure. To
testify about hazardous exposure, the epidemiologist must determine if
the risk attributable to the hazardous substance (the factor) is greater
Daubert, this publication contains excellent reference guides on epidemiology, toxicology,
survey research, forensic DNA evidence, statistics, multiple regression, and the estimation
of economic losses in damages awards).
142. Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 140, at 762.
143. Id. at 763. The Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates are as follows:
1. The prevalence rate of the disease should be significantly higher in those ex-
posed to the hypothesized cause than in controls not so exposed (the cause may
be present in the external environment or as a defect in host responses).
2. Exposure to the hypothesized cause should be more frequent among those
with the disease than in controls without the disease when all risk factors are held
constant.
3. Incidence of the disease should be significantly higher in those exposed to the
cause than in those not so exposed, as shown by prospective studies.
4. Temporally, the disease should follow exposure to the hypothesized causative
agent with the distribution of incubation periods on a log-normal-shaped curve.
5. A spectrum of host responses should follow exposure to the hypothesized
agent along a logical biologic gradient from mild to severe.
6. A measurable host response following exposure to the hypothesized cause
should have a high probability of appearing in those lacking this response before
exposure (e.g., antibody, cancer cells) or should increase in magnitude if present
before exposure; this response pattern should occur infrequently in persons not
so exposed.
7. Experimental reproduction of the disease should occur more frequently in
animals or man appropriately exposed to the hypothesized cause than in those
not so exposed; this exposure may be deliberate in volunteers, experimentally
induced in the laboratory, or demonstrated in a controlled regulation of natural
exposure.
8. Elimination or modification of the hypothesized cause or of the vector carry-
ing it should decrease the incidence of the disease (e.g., control of polluted water,
removal of tar from cigarettes).
9. Prevention or modification of the host's response on exposure to the hypoth-
esized cause should decrease or eliminate the disease (e.g., immunization, drugs
to lower cholesterol, specific lymphocyte transfer factor in cancer).
10. All of the relationships and findings should make biological and epidemio-
logic sense.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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than fifty percent (also expressed by epidemiologists as .50). 14
Epidemiological evidence has been deemed "[u]ndoubtedly ...the
most useful and conclusive type of evidence in a [toxic exposure] case."1
45
Epidemiological studies are regarded by the Environmental Protection
Agency as "the only unreservedly persuasive evidence of causal associa-
tions between an agent and human health effects.,
1 46
Despite the value of epidemiological evidence, however, it does not
provide an unimpeachable or foolproof method of establishing causation.
Among the problems encountered by plaintiffs seeking to use
[epidemiological] data is that [such] studies provide information
regarding trends in groups rather than the occurrence of a dis-
ease in a particular plaintiff.... The study groups often involve
levels of exposure to a substance far in excess of the level at
which plaintiffs were exposed, possibly rendering the results of
the study non-predictive or irrelevant.
1 47
Perhaps the most significant defects in epidemiological studies are "bi-
ases" which can invalidate a study's validity.' 48 Some of the most com-
mon "biases" are: selection bias ("the exposed group is selected in a way
that makes it more or less [prone] to disease for reasons [unrelated to]
exposure");149 diagnostic bias (when the disease is misdiagnosed); recall
bias (the failure of subjects to recollect accurately details of exposure);
and, the presence of unaccounted for confounders (an unrelated factor
144. Id. at 767.
Conceptually, the finder of fact must decide whether it is more likely than not
that an individual plaintiff contracted a specific disease as a result of exposure to a
factor for -which the defendant is legally responsible. From an epidemiological
perspective, the question has two parts: (1) is the factor causally related to the
disease (satisfaction of the Henle-Koch-Evans Postulates), and (2) is the attribu-
table risk greater than .50? If, in an exposed population, more than half the cases
of a disease can be attributed to the exposure, and if the postulates are satisfied,
then absent other information about a diseased individual, it is more likely than
not that his or her illness was caused by the exposure.
Id. (footnote omitted). Black and Lilienfeld continue with a hypothetical example of the
practical application of this so-called "evidentiary test." Id. at 767-68.
145. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307,311 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884
F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989). See also Terrell v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 374, 379 (N.D. Tex.
1981) ("Epidemiological evidence is critical in discovering the etiology, or cause of dis-
eases, particularly those which may have numerous causes.").
146. Whitehead & Espel, supra note 140, at 1043.
147. James D. Pagliaro & Amelia C. Benton, Courtroom Science: Toxic Tort Battle-
ground, 3 Toxic L. REP. (BNA) 1336, 1339 (1989).
148. See, e.g., David L. Sackett, Bias in Analytic Research, 32 J. CHRONiC DISEASES 51,
51 (1979).
149. Green, supra note 119, at 649.
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that nonetheless correlates with a greater or lower disease rate).
150
The importance of epidemiological studies, and the favor in which they
are generally held by the courts, can have a detrimental effect on a plain-
tiff who cannot produce a supporting epidemiological study.151 Several
plaintiffs have resorted to offering the re-analysis of already existent epi-
demiological data in an attempt to overcome this perceived proof prob-
lem. The practice of re-analysis, however; has received little support in
the courts under the Frye standard. 5 z
Epidemiological testimony should not be viewed as a panacea to all
problems posed by causation problems in toxic litigation. Although a val-
uable tool under certain circumstances, and occasionally the only scien-
tific evidence of causation that can be offered, problems of bias and
methodology almost always will surface and be exploited by defense ex-
perts. A case that relies exclusively on epidemiological evidence for
proof of causation is dangerously exposed to a strong defense attack.
2. Toxicology
Toxicology is "a science that deals with poisons and their effect[s].' 1
53
Toxicologists typically are used by plaintiffs to prove that the chemicals to
which the plaintiffs were exposed were toxic, and that the chemicals were
the source or exacerbating factor in the symptoms of which they com-
plain.'54 Toxicologists may use various studies upon which to base their
opinions, including cluster analysis, short term molecular assays, and
animal- bioassays. s"
Cluster analysis studys "diseases shared by members of a group ex-
posed to a single hazardous substance."' 56 An example of this form of
analysis is Pott's discovery of an association between scrotal cancer and
150. Id. at 649-51.
151. Epidemiological studies are often lengthy, hence expensive, undertakings. In addi-
tion, the necessary data simply might not exist.
152. See, e.g., Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 313-15 (5th Cir. 1989)
(reanalysis of epidemiological studies generally accepted by the scientific community only
when subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in the field); Richardson v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 830-31 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Although the issue of reanalysis of
epidemiological data was raised by the appellant in Keene Corp., 626 A.2d 966 (Md. App.
1993), the court of special appeals held that the expert in that case merely summarized the
epidemiological data and did not reanalyze it. Id. at 1005.
153. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 2419 (1986).
154. DeVries, supra note 102, at 819.
155. Brennan, supra note 2, at 502. Brennan also identifies epidemiological studies as a
fourth method for identifying carcinogens. These were discussed supra note 2.
156. Id.
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chimney sweeping.15 7 Although cluster analysis is not considered to be
an epidemiological study, it is however, open to the same problems of
bias and confounders faced by epidemiologists.
158
Short term molecular assays test potentially carcinogenic substances.
Substances that "pass" are deemed "non-carcinogenic." Those sub-
stances that fail are then studied further.159
Brennan acknowledges that the science of short term assay research is
still being developed, and questions remain as to how best to combine the
tests to identify the substances that are mutagens, and thus presumably
carcinogens.
160
The fundamental assumption underlying animal assays is that sub-
stances that are carciriogenic in animals also will be carcinogenic in
humans.1 61 These studies are typically conducted with a control group
and a group intentionally exposed to the hazardous substance.' 62 The
results between the two groups are then compared, and "[t]he amount by
which the experimental results differ from the null hypothesis [a re-
searcher's initial assumption that the hazardous substance will have no
effect] can be summarized in a 'trend test statistic.""11
63
157. Hermo, Chemical Carcinogenesis: Tumor Initiation and Promotion, 2 OCCUPA-
TIONAL MED. 1, 6 (1987), cited in Brennan, supra note 2, at 502 n.177.
158. See notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
159. Brennan, supra note 2, at 503.
Short-term assays are based on certain molecular theories of carcinogenesis re-
garding the disruption of deoxyribonucleic acids (DNA). Similar disruption is
thought to occur in mutagenesis. Therefore, attention has long focused on the
correlation of carcinogenesis with mutagenesis.
A mutation is an abrupt and heritable genetic change. Thus a mutation is any
change in the genetic material of the cell that is passed to following generations.
This may mean a change in a single nucleotide (individual molecule of DNA), in
several nucleotides within the same gene (a functional group of DNA molecules
within a chromosome), or in an entire chromosome. Mutations may change a
normal gene into a mutant (forward mutation) or a mutant gene into a normal
one (reverse mutation).
Id. (footnote omitted).
160. Id. at 504 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
161. See, e.g., Federal Periodical Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 191
(1994) ("In qualitative extrapolation one can usually rely on the fact that a compound
causing an effect in one mammalian species will cause it in another species.") [hereinafter
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence].
162. Although this is the "gold standard" for human epidemiological studies as well, for
obvious ethical reasons, this form of research is impossible in hazardous substance
research.
163. Brennan, supra note 2, at 505.
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458 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:423
The trend test statistic can be converted into a p-value, or probability
value, defined as:
the probability of observing an apparent effect of exposure as
great or greater than that actually found if chance alone were
responsible for any apparent effects seen in the data. Statistical
significance is usually arbitrarily defined as a p-value of less than
.05; that is, chance alone can explain the results of the experi-
ment only five percent of the time.'"
If a substance is shown to be carcinogenic in animals, the scientist as-
sumes that it is carcinogenic in humans and attempts to calculate the dose
necessary to provoke a cancer response in humans, using mathematical
models.
165
The problems with such animal tests in the litigation context are readily
apparent. The degree of abstraction in this form of study-from the ini-
tial assumption that a substance that causes cancer in animals will also
cause cancer in humans,'166 through the calculation of p-values, to the es-
timation of a toxic dose in humans using mathematical models that are
highly malleable-is high. Animal studies are slender reeds upon which
to base a claim for damages.
Indeed, several courts have excluded testimony regarding animal stud-
ies.1 67 Furthermore, although the Environmental Protection Agency ac-
164. Id. Brennan describes the conversion from trend test statistic to p-value as assum-
ing that "the trend statistics from an infinite number of identical bioassays would simulate
a normal distribution-meaning that they would resemble a bell-shaped curve if graphed
with one axis representing the probability of occurrence, and the other representing the
trend statistic itself." Id. at 505 n.191.
165. "Mathematical depiction of the process by which an external does more through
various compartments in the body until it reaches the target organ is often called physio-
logically based pharmacollincties .... [R]eliance on in vitro data for elucidating mecha-
nisms of toxicity is more pervasive where positive human epidemiological data also exist."
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra note 161, at 192.
166. This is a particularly dangerous assumption when the animal in question, for exam-
ple the B6C3F1 mouse, has been bred for the specific purpose of developing cancer.
DeVries, supra note 102, at 820.
167. See, e.g., In Re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
There is no evidence that plaintiffs were exposed to the far higher concentrations
involved in both the animal and industrial exposure studies. The animal studies
are not helpful in the instant case because they involve different biological spe-
cies. They are of so little probative value as to be inadmissible. They cannot be
an acceptable predicate for an opinion under Rule 703.
Id. Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Lab., 646 F. Supp. 856, 865-66 (D. Mass. 1986) ("There are
several limitations inherent in the use of the animal and other experimental data relied
upon here by the plaintiffs, and these limitations have been conceded in prior testimony by
plaintiffs' witnesses." The court concluded that the studies were inadmissible because
Hazardous Substance Litigation in Maryland
cepts animal data as evidence of carcinogenity, even in the absence of




The challenges facing the courts from hazardous substance litigation
show no signs of abating, as experts in new areas of expertise'are offered
by attorneys seeking to recover for, or defend against, new legal theories
spawned by scientific discoveries. Faced with the rapid pace of progress
in the area of exposure to hazardous substances, courts must continue to
evaluate the theories of recovery offered by attorneys, and the modes of
proof of causation, according to well-established standards, neither re-
warding parties for ingenuity without substance nor punishing them for
creativity and innovation.'
69
"they are performed in other biological species and at doses far in excess of the human
therapeutic doses.").
168. Commentators have noted that the EPA's decision is based on regulatory policy,
and not "scientific evidence." Whitehead & Espel, supra note 140. The reasons for this
interpretation flow from the EPA's choice of language. By accepting animal studies in the
absence of epidemiological studies, the EPA acknowledges that it cannot exclude bias or
other confounding factors as a possible cause for the carcinogenic effect. "This position
means that EPA assumes its answer to the question of probability. Such a regulatory as-
sumption does not establish proof in tort litigation." Id.
169. For an encyclopedic treatment of litigation and hazardous substances, see LAW-
RENCE G. CETRULLO, Toxic TORTS: A COMPLETE PERSONAL INJURY GUIDE (1993).
1997]

